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Abstract 
We model the effects of quantitative easing on the volatility of returns to individual gilts, 
examining both the effects of QE overall and of the specific days of asset purchases. The action 
of QE successfully neutralized the six fold increase in volatility that had been experienced by 
gilts since the start of the financial crisis. The volatility of longer term bonds reduced more 
quickly than the volatility of short to medium term bonds. The reversion of the volatility of 
shorter term bonds to pre-crisis levels was found to be more sensitive to the specific operational 
actions of QE, particularly where they experienced relatively greater purchase activity. 
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1. Introduction 
The gilt-edged market, the market for UK government bonds, has been the main instrument 
through which the Bank of England has operated its policy of quantitative easing, a programme 
of expansionary monetary policy through asset purchases funded by electronic money creation. 
While there have been a number of studies of the effects of quantitative easing on the UK bond 
market, these have focussed exclusively on determining the success or otherwise of this 
unconventional form of monetary policy.1 However, the gilt-market is also a major vehicle for 
those seeking long term fixed interest investments, for example pension funds and life insurance 
companies. This study examines the effects of quantitative easing from a bond investor’s 
viewpoint and looks in particular at whether the volatility in the market has been affected by the 
asset purchase operations. This is important because if investors perceive volatility to have risen, 
they may require a greater premium for holding longer term gilts, raising the cost of financing 
government expenditure, and worsening the very economic outlook that the quantitative easing is 
designed to improve. Moreover, the costs to financial institutions and others using fixed income 
derivatives for hedging purposes will be directly affected by significant changes in the volatility 
of the underlying bonds. 
The quantitative easing programme in the UK can be divided into three phases of 
activity. The first phase, QE1, between March 2009 and January 2010, saw £200 billion spent to 
purchase assets, mostly gilts. By the end of QE1 40% of the stock outstanding of 3-10 year 
maturity bonds were purchased, 50% of the 10-25 year maturity bonds, and 15% of the more 
than 25 years maturity bonds were purchased. The purchases were conducted using a reverse 
auction process, auctions, whereby counterparties submitted prices at which they offered to sell 
specific quantities of individual gilts. Non-competitive (quantity only) bids were also permitted, 
with successful bids paying the average accepted competitive price. Other assets such as 
commercial paper and corporate bonds were also purchased by the Bank but in significantly 
smaller quantities, and these were being sold back into the market by December 2009. At the 
meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee held on the 4th of February 2010, the members 
decided not to increase the limit for asset purchases further. In October 2011 the second round of 
                                                          
1. For example, Meier (2009), Joyce et al (2011), Glick and Leduc (2012), Meaning and Zhu (2011), Joyce and Tong (2012) and 
Breedon et al (2012). These together with studies looking at the US experience and the wider economic effects of QE are 
surveyed in Joyce et al (2012) and Martin and Milas (2012). 
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quantitative easing began (QE2) after the members of the Monetary Policy Committee voted to 
increase the limit of asset purchases further by £75 billion. A further increase of £50 billion was 
announced in February 2012 and the purchases were accomplished by the 2nd of May 2012. After 
only a two-month gap the QE asset purchase facility was restarted again. On the 5th of July 2012, 
the MPC announced a further £50 billion of gilt purchases, to be completed by November 2012, 
this phase being identified as QE3.2 
In an efficient financial market, macroeconomic news should be fully and instantaneously 
reflected in market prices (and returns). Ross (1989) used a no-arbitrage martingale theoretical 
asset pricing framework to establish that asset price volatility represents the rate of information 
flow into an efficient market. Higher volatility implies a higher rate of flow of information into 
prices and thus a more efficient market. The relationship between financial market volatility and 
macroeconomic news, in particular, is developed in the theoretical work of Veronesi (1999). In 
this model, if the uncertainty surrounding macroeconomic fundamentals is high, then news 
causes asset prices to move much more than when this uncertainty is lower. 
Empirical investigation of the link between information flow, specifically 
macroeconomic news, and bond market return volatility commenced with the study by Jones, 
Lamont and Lumsdaine (1998).3 The authors use high frequency data and apply a GARCH 
model to analyze the effect of macroeconomic news announcements on bond market volatility in 
the US They find that Treasury bond returns and volatility are significantly higher on the 
announcement days of US macroeconomic data such as the unemployment statistics and the 
producer price index. However, they also show that the news effect is short-lived, so that the 
impact on volatility disappears soon after the announcement. De Goeij and Marquering (2006) 
also examine daily returns on US Treasury bonds, between 1982 and 2004, but use a GARCH 
model that includes a threshold variable to distinguish the effects of positive and negative news 
announcements. They find negative news tends to have a greater impact on volatility. Arnold and 
Vrugt (2010) study the relationship between macroeconomic uncertainty, measured by the log 
                                                          
2. Although the QE2 and QE3 phases have been separately distinguished in some recent survey papers, Joyce et al (2012) and 
Martin and Milas (2012), the short gap between them may mean that this distinction is not preserved in the future. 
3. While we confine this review to studies of macroeconomic news and bond market volatility, there are longer established 
parallel literatures examining the effects of conventional monetary policy surprises and other macroeconomic news on returns in 
stock and bond markets and volatility in stock markets both within and across countries, for example, Balduzzi et al., 2001, 
Bomfim, 2003, Ederington and Lee, 1993, Graham et al., 2003, Kearney and Lombra, 2004, Nikkinen and Sahlström, 2001, 
2004a, 2004b, 2006. 
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sum of absolute residuals from an AR(1) process applied to several different macroeconomic 
variables, and bond volatility measured by the quarterly standard deviation of returns. They find 
much stronger links between uncertainty and volatility than in the previous studies, also 
providing strong support for the theoretical framework of Veronesi (1999). Huang and Lu (2008) 
use a principal components analysis to decompose macroeconomic variables into real and 
monetary factors. They find that while real factors influence volatility across the maturity 
spectrum, monetary variables influence only the volatility of short and medium term bonds. 
Nowak et al (2011) show that the response of volatility to macroeconomic news is considerably 
slower in the bond markets of emerging countries relative to those of more mature economies.  
Abad and Chulia (2013) find that the volatility of European bond markets increase following 
monetary policy surprises. Won et al (2013) examine the effect of unanticipated changes in a 
country’s credit spread on the volatility in its bond market, looking in particular at the markets in 
Brazil, Russia, China and Turkey. They document an asymmetry in the relation wherein 
increases in credit spreads have a greater impact on volatility than decreases in credit spreads. 
They also identified a feedback effect from volatility to credit spreads, but only during the 
financial crisis, indicating that credit spreads and bond market volatility could interact to 
generate further market instability. 
 While there have been no studies looking directly at the effect of QE on bond market 
volatility, there have been some studies that have considered the effect of QE on equity market 
volatility. Tan and Kohli (2011) examine the volatility of the US stock market over the period 
2008 to 2011, which encompasses the US QE1 and QE2 phases. They examine three models of 
volatility, an AR(1) process and a modified constant elasticity of variance model, both applied to 
the VIX measure of implied volatility for the S&P500 index, and the conditional volatility from a 
GARCH(1,1) model applied to the returns to the S&P500 index. They find that the onset of QE 
led to a significant drop in stock index volatility that then reverted to previous levels following 
the ending of a phase of QE. Joyce et al (2011) examine the behavior of the option-implied 
volatility of the FTSE100 index between January 2009 and June 2010, a period encompassing 
the UK QE1 phase. They found that the twelve-month implied volatility fell by around 40% 
during 2009. They also constructed an option-implied probability distribution for the FTSE100 
returns and found that it narrowed between February 2009 and February 2010, with the (lower) 
tail risk falling considerably. 
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The earliest study of the conditional volatility of UK government bonds is Steeley (1992) 
who applied the time varying volatility model of Taylor (1986) and Taylor and Kingsman (1979) 
to the returns of individual gilts around the time of the 1986 Big Bang deregulation of the UK 
financial markets. This model uses an exponentially-weighted average of the absolute value of 
the deviation of returns from their average to create a sequence of conditional volatility forecasts. 
He showed that the volatility of gilts declined in the aftermath of the deregulation. Longer term 
historical perspectives are provided by both Anderson and Breedon (2000) and Johnson and 
Young (2002) who studied the periods 1946-1995 and 1957 to 2000, respectively. Both studies 
document a significant increase in UK bond market volatility between 1972 and 1975, and a 
gradual downward trend thereafter. Steeley and Ahmad (2002) focus on the effects of the flight 
to quality following the Asian crisis and the dot.com boom and bust in equity markets around the 
end of the last millennium. They find a significant decrease in the volatility of the UK bond 
market at this time as the market enjoyed “safe-haven” status. 
This paper contributes to and extends these existing literatures in several ways. First, it is 
the first study to directly consider the impact of QE on the volatility of the UK bond market. 
Second, by focussing on the experience of individual bonds, it examines QE from the perspective 
of bond market investors. Third, by contrast to most prior studies of the effects of QE in the UK 
that consider only the first round of QE, between 2009 and 2010, this study additionally 
considers the more recent second and third rounds. Fourth, there have been very few studies of 
the volatility of the UK bond market, and none considering the time interval since 2001, and so 
this study provides further and more current evidence of the behavior of volatility in this market. 
 The key findings of this paper are the following. Using a GARCH based model of 
conditional return volatility, we document a significant increase in bond market volatility prior to 
the commencement of QE. This appears to begin at the point that the Bank of England offered 
special liquidity support to the Northern Rock bank in September 2007. This increase in 
volatility was as much as 600 percent for longer term government bonds. The first phase of QE 
led to a gradual reduction in bond market volatility, back to pre-crisis levels for ultra-short and 
long term bonds, but to levels still significantly above the pre-crisis levels for short and medium 
maturity bonds. The subsequent phases of QE led to further significant reductions in volatility, so 
that all bonds had volatility back at the pre-crisis levels or lower. Using an event study 
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methodology, we also uncover a pre-announcement drift downwards in the volatility of gilts 
across the month ahead of the Bank of England’s first announcement relating to QE, its intention 
to establish an asset purchase facility. Using cross section regressions, we find that bonds that 
experienced relatively more purchase auction activity saw relatively less reduction in volatility 
during the first phase of QE. However, this effect diminishes through the later QE periods, and 
can be counteracted by a large excess supply of an individual gilt for purchase. By examining the 
relationship between the UK money supply and gilt volatility, we are able to conclude that the 
effects of QE on gilt volatility were unlikely to be arising through a portfolio rebalancing 
channel. Overall, the phases of QE and specific purchase auction activity had significant effects 
on the volatility of gilts, but this has been to successfully neutralize the increase in volatility that 
was experienced in the preceding two years. This likely indicates that the effects of QE on gilt 
volatility were mostly operating through a signalling channel, providing a calming influence on 
the market. 
 This rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources and 
sample periods, and presents the empirical methods that will be used. Section 3 presents the 
results of the analysis, and Section 4 offers some conclusions and a summary of the results. 
2. Data and Methods 
We use a sample of 24 UK government bonds that collectively span the period January 1st, 2004 
to May 10th, 2013. This is a period of 2362 trading days. The bonds selected comprise all the 
conventional style gilts that had at least 2 years of data available during the sample period and a 
maturity of at least three years ahead of the start of the QE1 phase. The three years to maturity 
limit ensures that a bond meets the two years of data requirement and is not affected by a “pull-
to-par” effect on price as the bond approaches maturity.4 The bonds range in maturity from 3 
years out to the year 2055, with all maturity regions well populated with bonds. Bonds that were 
issued or redeemed during the sample period were included provided they met the inclusion 
criteria above. In addition to the individual bond data, we also examine the Financial Times 
Actuaries long gilt index to see whether effects found in individual bonds are repeated at the 
level of the index. Daily closing clean bond price data and index data are collected from 
                                                          
4. Steeley and Ahmad (2002) and Steeley (1992) present evidence of a pull-to-par effect that can distort the time series statistics 
of very short-term to maturity bond returns. 
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Datastream, and are used to calculate returns as the log daily change in clean price for the bonds, 
and the log daily change in the index level for the index. 
2.1 Modelling the effects of QE on volatility 
We use the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) family of 
statistical processes (Engle, 1982 and Bollerslev, 1986) to model jointly the conditional mean 
and variance of individual bond returns. In this model, the conditional variance is a linear 
function of a number of squared previous errors and a number of previous conditional variances. 
The specific model that will be applied to each of the time series of bond returns is  
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where , is the return (log change in closing clean price) of bond j at time t. The specifications 
in equation (1) are standard and have an ARMA(1,1) process for the conditional mean, and a 
GARCH(1,1) specification for the conditional variance.5 The variable ' is an indicator variable 
that takes the value 1 if ,	
 ) 0 and is zero otherwise. This variable, initially proposed by 
Glosten et al (1993), permits the conditional volatility to respond asymmetrically to positive and 
negative news. Where this interaction variable does not significantly improve the model, the 
standard GARCH(1,1) model is used. 
A set of 14 dummy (indicator) variables is introduced into both the conditional mean and 
conditional variance specifications to capture differences arising from QE and other bond market 
events. The first dummy variable takes the value 1 during the first phase of QE, and zero at all 
                                                          
5. We estimated the model under the assumption that the error distribution is normal. We also estimated the model with the 
Generalized Error Distribution, GED, see Nelson (1991). Despite observing non-normality (primarily excess kurtosis) in the 
individual bond return distributions, the estimated GED tail parameter was indistinguishable from its value under normality for 
many of the bonds, and the estimated coefficients underwent negligible quantitative changes and no qualitative changes. We also 
tested for the presence of direct feedback from the conditional variance equation to the conditional mean equation, the GARCH-
M model, see Engle et al, (1987). While this model was initially developed within a model of the yield curve, we could not reject 
the hypothesis that the “in-mean” term did not improve the model for individual bond returns.  
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other times. The second and third dummy variables are constructed similarly to indicate the 
second and third phases of QE. We also include four day of the week dummy variables. As our 
sample period begins prior to the financial crisis, we also include an indicator variable for the 
period of the crisis leading up to QE1. We start this period on September 14, 2007, the date that 
Northern Rock bank received special liquidity support from the Bank of England to help with its 
exposure to the sub-prime lending market. 
In addition to the broad indicators for the QE phases, we also include an indicator for the 
specific days upon which the Bank of England operated its asset purchase facility (APF) and 
bought gilts through purchase auctions in the market during the QE phases. This is aimed at 
determining whether the effects of the QE phases were more than just the cumulative response to 
a set of purchases auctions. We also add a further indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the 
particular bond being modelled was the one subject to QE purchase on that day. This permits us 
to determine whether the effects of the asset purchases are asset specific or cross over to other 
bonds. The data on the bonds being purchased and the dates of the APF operations were obtained 
from the Bank of England’s website. 
We also account for the impact of announcements relating to monetary policy and in 
particular QE. We do this by including an indicator variable that takes the value of one on days 
of specific announcements relating to QE and takes the value zero otherwise. The details of these 
announcements are given in Table 1. We include a further variable that takes the value one on 
days that the MPC announced the results of their monthly meetings, and is zero otherwise. 
While some previous studies of QE have considered an event study approach to 
examining the effects of purchase auctions, for example, Joyce et al (2011) and Meaning and 
Zhu (2011), the clear dependence of their results on the event window length, pointed out by 
Martin and Milas (2012), suggests that there is value in examining other approaches. The 
regression approach that we adopt has the advantage of permitting multiple factors to be 
considered simultaneously. The previous event studies implicitly assume that the characteristics 
of the event windows are constant across bonds, whereas some bonds may have experienced 
issuance within the event window while others may not have had this happen. In October 2008, 
the UK Treasury’s funding remit for the gilt market was raised by £37bn to assist with the 
recapitalization the UK banking sector. This led to a huge increase in both gross and net issuance 
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of gilts. This can be seen in Figure 1. From the financial year 2008-2009, gross annual issuance 
was three times its pre-crisis peak level. As this extra issuance continued through into the QE1 
phase, and indeed continued throughout the sample period, it is essential to control for this other 
significant activity within the gilt market at this time. The relative size of issuance and APF 
activity over the sample can be seen in Figure 2, where it can be seen that there were occasions 
when the purchase activity outstripped the issuance activity. These two activities displayed a 
systematic pattern during the week, which can be seen in Figures 3 and 4, with Wednesday 
observing peaks for both issuance and purchases. To capture the effects of issuance, we construct 
two dummy variables, of a similar form to those created to capture the effects of bond purchase 
auctions. One of these variables takes the value one on a day on which bonds were issued and 
zero otherwise, and the other variable takes the value one if the particular bond is itself 
experiencing further issuance. Evidence that secondary offerings affect gilt prices can be found 
in Breedon and Ganley (2000), who studied the period 1997-98 and Ahmad and Steeley (2008), 
who studied the period 2001-2007. Both find that prices are bid down before an auction and rise 
strongly afterwards. Evidence that auction activity might affect volatility is provided by Hughes 
et al (2008), who show that weeks of US Treasury Bill auctions show greater volatility in the 
market than weeks without auctions. 
Although our modeling framework is designed to capture the effects of QE on bond 
volatility controlling for differences in within the bonds themselves, it does not directly control 
for (non-QE) macro-level factors. Unlike financial market data, that is available at ever 
increasing frequencies, economic data is usually released on a monthly basis, sometimes 
quarterly. This presents a challenge to incorporating macro-level controls on financial market 
models that use higher frequency data, such as is the case here. The most readily available proxy 
variable for business conditions on a daily basis is the return on the stock market. To try to 
establish whether our methods and results are robust to changes in the general economic 
environment, we re-formulated the model in equation (1) with the inclusion of the stock market 
return included in both the mean and volatility equations. This made little difference to the sign, 
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size and significance of estimated parameters and changed none of our conclusions. To preserve 
space, we present only the results of the model without the inclusion of the market return.6 
2.2 A volatility event study 
 Although event studies typically focus on returns, specifically abnormal returns, and 
among the QE studies there is a clear dependence on the event window, it is nonetheless 
interesting to augment our regression approach with a volatility based event study. Specifically, 
we will examine whether the widely anticipated use of QE caused any change in bond market 
volatility before formal announcements relating to QE. Evidence that financial markets might 
anticipate monetary policy announcements has been found by Lucca and Moench (2011), who 
showed that US equities earned abnormal returns ahead of the Federal Open Market 
Committee’s announcements of US monetary policy actions, a phenomenon they have labeled 
“pre-FOMC announcement drift”. We examine four “events”, the announcement of the start of 
each period of QE and, prior to this in January 2009, the announcement of the intention to 
establish an asset purchase facility by the Bank of England. The announcements are detailed in 
Table 1. We use windows of 10, 20 and 40 days prior to each of the announcements, and 
calculate the cumulative change in daily return volatility – measured by the squared return – 
averaged across each of the gilts. To determine the significance of the cumulative average 
change in volatility, we compute t-tests following the same standard procedures as would be 
adopted were this instead an event study of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR). 
2.3 Explaining the impacts of QE on gilt volatility: Bond characteristics 
In addition to identifying whether the volatility of gilts is influenced by the phases of QE, 
announcements, events and specific purchase and issuance activity, we investigate what makes a 
particular bond more susceptible to having its volatility influenced by these factors. We do this 
by regressing the coefficients (,  (standardized by their regression standard error) from the time 
series model, equation (1), against the following cross-section characteristics of the bonds.7 We 
                                                          
6. The results including the market return are available on request. Later in this paper, however, we report on an analysis using 
monthly gilt volatility measures to understand the relation between changes in the money supply, as another macro-level factor, 
and gilt volatility. 
7. The set of variables examined is similar to those used in the event studies of individual gilt QE purchase auctions, Joyce and 
Tong (2012), and of individual gilt secondary issues, Ahmad and Steeley (2008). 
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include the bond’s coupon rate and time to maturity as regressors. As short term yields were 
falling during the sample period, while the maturity of new bonds being issued was rising, 
coupon and maturity are moderately negatively correlated (-0.43). For the regressions that 
examine the sensitivity of volatility to the phases of QE, we also include a measure of the 
purchase activity that the bond experienced during the phases of QE. This regressor is the total 
volume of purchases by the Bank of England as a proportion of the average of stock of the gilt 
outstanding at the beginning of QE1 and the stock outstanding at the end of sample period. Each 
of the purchase auctions differed by the amount by which the offers to sell stock to the Bank 
exceeded the amount purchased by the Bank. This measure of excess supply is known as the 
Cover Ratio. A further measure of excess supply is the Tail, which is the amount by which the 
highest accepted ask price exceeds the (weighted) average accepted ask price. The smaller the 
tail, the greater the excess supply. We combine both of these measures into a single measure of 
excess supply by extracting the first principal component of the correlation between the two 
variables. This excess supply measure is then the fourth regressor included alongside coupon, 
maturity and purchase auction activity. 
We use the same regressor variables to examine the sensitivity of volatility to the days of 
bond purchase activity. To examine the determinants of the sensitivity to announcements relating 
specifically to QE and of the announcements of the outcome of each MPC meeting, we again 
include coupon, maturity and the same measure of purchase activity. But now we replace the 
excess supply variable with a measure of the issuance activity that the bond experiences during 
the sample period. This is the change in the stock outstanding between the beginning and end of 
the sample period (or between the original and redemption dates if these are inside the limits of 
the sample period). To examine the determinants of volatility sensitivity to issuance activity, we 
re-use this issuance variable along with coupon and maturity as regressors. For these issuance 
based regressions, we replace the purchase activity regressor variable with a measure of the size 
of the issue at the beginning of the sample period. 
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2.4 Explaining the impacts of QE on gilt volatility: Monetary transmission 
Finally, we investigate whether the monetary transmission channels that might arise from 
QE could themselves be driving the volatility of the gilt market. Quantitative easing has three 
main channels through which it can affect the economy.  The first is a signaling channel. The use 
of QE demonstrates a commitment to low interest rates and monetary easing more generally, and 
this is likely to boost investment and consumption. The second is a liquidity channel. In this 
case, the purchases of gilts from the banks, by the Bank of England, enhance their reserve levels, 
that should then facilitate greater lending to commercial activity. The third channel is a portfolio 
balance channel, whereby the purchases of gilts may lead to an increase in asset prices, which 
leads to both wealth effects and lower costs of capital, that in turn boosts the economy through 
increased investment and consumption. As well as the direct upward pressure on gilt prices that 
may arise from the Bank’s purchases, there can arise an additional “ripple effect” to increase the 
prices of other assets if the sellers of the gilts do not regard the cash received as a perfect 
substitute for the gilts sold, and use the cash to purchase other assets. This process may continue 
until all asset prices have been bid upwards to rebalance asset portfolios to accommodate the 
increased cash balances.8  
Both the changes in bank reserves through the liquidity channel and the portfolio 
rebalancing activity that arise as a consequence of central bank asset purchases are likely to 
influence the measured money supply. Indeed the electronic money creation used to finance the 
purchases represents a pure increase in the money supply. It is possible therefore that if bond 
volatility is responding to QE activity, it will show some correspondence to changes in the 
money supply. To determine whether there is a direct link between the money supply and gilt 
volatility, we undertake bivariate Granger-causality tests between the money supply and each of 
the individual gilt volatility series. A variable x is said to Granger-cause a variable y if past 
values of x have a significance influence on the current value of y, after controlling for the 
influence of an equal number of past values of y, and the reverse is not observed. The 
significance of the past values of x is usually established with a Wald test of the joint 
significance of a sub-set of regression coefficients. The monthly money supply data, UK M0, is 
                                                          
8. See Benford et al (2009) for more detail on how each of these QE transmission channels operates. 
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obtained from the Bank of England’s website.9 This is matched to monthly volatility measures 
for each of the individual gilts. These are calculated as the standard deviation of the daily returns 
to the gilt for the period in between each of the monthly money supply data releases. 
We use the approach to testing for Granger-causality proposed by Toda and Yamamoto 
(1995). This first requires that the order of integration of each series is established. Then the 
variables are combined in a vector autoregression (VAR), which has a lag length determined by 
information criteria, and then adds additional lags to remove any remaining residual 
autocorrelation. Finally, to ensure that the Wald tests for non-causality have an asymptotic chi-
squared distribution when one or more of the variables may be non-stationary, m additional lags 
are added to the VAR, where m is the maximum order of integration observed in either series. 
The coefficients on these extra m lags are not included in the Wald tests, which use only the 
coefficients of those lags necessary to optimize the information criterion and remove any 
residual autocorrelation. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for the daily returns to each of the gilts in the sample are contained in Table 
2. Allowing for the differences in sample size, the mean returns and the return standard 
deviations both show the expected positive relation with the maturity of the bond. The skewness 
and kurtosis of returns indicate departure from a normal distribution, particularly for the excess 
kurtosis. The kurtosis is greater for the shorter maturity bonds, which at least in part reflects the 
greater number of zero return days among these bonds. Zero returns are most commonly 
observed as the bond approaches its maturity date, which suggests that there may still be some 
residual pull-to-par effects in the data, despite the sample selection attempts to minimize this. 
The excess kurtosis could also be a symptom of time varying variances, which we shall examine 
further below. 
                                                          
9. Our use of a narrow measure of the money supply represents a conservative approach and avoids endogeneities arising from 
some of the bonds being counted in the money supply measure. 
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 Table 3 reports the estimated autocorrelation statistics of the daily returns up to lag five. 
These indicate that there is significant positive first order autocorrelation in almost all of the 
daily bond returns. For the longer term bonds, there is also significant negative second and third 
order autocorrelation in the returns. While statistically significant, the autocorrelations detected 
are rarely beyond 10 percent in absolute value. Steeley and Ahmad (2002) have shown that 
autocorrelations of this magnitude within individual UK bond returns cannot be exploited for 
economic profit. 
 Alongside excess kurtosis, a further indication that returns might exhibit a time varying 
variance structure is evidenced by significant autocorrelation in the squares or absolute values of 
the returns. Table 4 contains the associated autocorrelation statistics for squared returns up to lag 
five. These statistics are considerably larger than those observed for the returns in Table 3, where 
for first order autocorrelation they reach beyond 40 percent. All the autocorrelation coefficients 
for all the bonds at all lags up to five are statistically significant at 0.1 percent. This Table 
provides strong evidence that individual bond returns possess a time varying variance structure. 
3.2 The effects of QE on the volatility of individual gilts 
We use the GARCH model described in Section 2.1 above to estimate the time varying variance 
structure for each of the individual bonds, also permitting the variance level to change during the 
phases of QE. The estimated coefficients from this model are displayed in Tables 5 and 6. Table 
5 contains the estimated coefficients for the conditional mean equation component of equation 
(1), while Table 6 contains the estimated coefficients for the conditional volatility equation. 
 The estimated parameters for the conditional mean equation, in Table 5, indicate that the 
QE1 phase led to a lowering of the returns of the short and medium term gilts below the level 
observed prior to the crisis. This is consistent with the existing literature that showed that QE1 
led to a lowering of bond yields.10 By contrast, the period preceding QE1 and the QE2 and QE3 
phases did not lead to significant changes in gilt returns compared to their pre-crisis levels. Mean 
returns did not seem to respond to announcements made by the MPC, specific announcements 
relating to aspects of QE, or to issuance activity. However, on days of APF activity, the gilt 
purchases by the Bank of England act to increase the price (and hence observed return) of all 
                                                          
10. These studies are summarized in Joyce et al (2012) and Martin and Milas (2012) 
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gilts on these days, although for the ultra-short term gilts these increases are not statistically 
significant. These findings are also consistent with the results of prior event studies on the price 
effects of QE that also found increases in gilt prices on these days. There is little evidence of 
bond specific purchases effects on returns beyond this general effect, except for some ultra-long 
term gilts. The results for the bond index are consistent with those found for the individual 
bonds. 
Table 6 contains the estimated parameters for the conditional volatility equation for each 
bond and the bond index. The estimated parameters on the lagged squared residual and past 
conditional variance indicate that the variance processes are stable, and imply half-lives of 
shocks of between 2 to 3 days for the shorter term bonds, and up to 30 days for longer term 
bonds. Six of the bonds and also the bond index display evidence that news has an asymmetric 
effect on volatility depending upon whether it is bad news or good news, the latter having a 
greater impact. The day of the week dummy variables indicate that there are significant 
differences in volatility across the week. For shorter term bonds, the coefficients imply that 
volatility is typically higher on a Monday than for the remaining days of the week. For medium 
to long term bonds, the coefficients imply that volatility on a Monday is typically lower than on a 
Tuesday and on a Wednesday, and for some bonds also on a Friday. Thursday’s volatility is little 
different to that on a Monday. Some of the explanation for this may come from the patterns of 
issuance and APF activity that were presented in Figures 3 and 4, where Monday and 
Wednesday saw peaks in purchase activity, while Wednesday and Friday saw peaks in issuance 
activity. 
 We now examine whether volatility was affected by the onset of the financial crisis, the 
period from the run on the Northern Rock bank until the start of QE1, and each of the individual 
phases of QE. The period from the Northern Rock run until QE1 appears to have led to a 
significant rise in the volatility of UK government bonds at most maturities, particularly so for 
the short to medium term maturity bonds. This is indicated by the positive and significant 
coefficients on the variable “N-Rock”, which takes the value one during the pre-QE1 period and 
is otherwise zero. This can also be seen visually in Figure 5, which shows examples of the 
estimated conditional volatility process across the whole sample period for bonds representing 
the different maturity ranges. For the ultra-short term and short term bonds depicted, there is a 
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step change increase in volatility on the day of the run on Northen Rock and, in each case, 
volatility steadily increases thereafter until the start of QE1. The figures also show that while 
volatility was around the same level across the maturity spectrum before the financial crisis, the 
increase in volatility observed between September 2007 and March 2009 was greater for the 
longer term bonds. For the shorter term bonds, the peak of volatility at the start of QE1 was 
around double the pre-crisis average, whereas for the medium and longer term bond, the peak 
levels were between four and six times greater than the pre-crisis levels. 
 The graphs in Figure 5 also show that the start of the QE process led to a gradual 
lowering of the volatility from these peak levels. The parameter estimates for the QE1 period in 
Table 6 show that volatility reduced back to pre-crisis levels during the QE1 period, for most of 
the ultra-short term and long term bonds. For these bonds, the coefficient on the QE1 dummy 
variable is not significant, indicating that the volatility on these bonds during the QE1 phase was 
not significantly different to the level pre-crisis. Since volatility had increased prior to QE1, this 
means that during QE1 bond volatility – for the ultra-short and long-term bonds reduced back to 
pre-crisis levels. By contrast, the short term and medium term maturity bonds, while 
experiencing a drop in volatility, seen in Figure 5, remained at levels of volatility significantly 
higher than for the pre-crisis levels. For these bonds, the coefficients on both the “N-Rock” 
indicator variable and the “QE1” indicator variable are significantly different from zero, 
evidence that in both periods volatility was above the pre-crisis level. From inspection of Figure 
5, however, we can see that volatility nonetheless declined during QE1.  
In the period between QE1 and QE2, the volatility of gilt returns appears to experience 
fewer peaks, but towards the end of this period can be seen to increase once more, particularly 
among medium and longer term gilts. The next two periods of QE, QE2 and QE3, both act to 
reduce volatility in the gilt market once more. In the case of ultra-short term and short term gilts, 
this reduction is to levels significantly lower than the pre-crisis average. Some of this reduction 
could be due to the nearness to maturity. For the medium and longer term bonds the levels of 
volatility by the end of QE3 are not significantly different from those experienced before the 
financial crisis. The results for the gilt index also display the pattern of a significant increase in 
volatility ahead of QE1, and a return to pre-crisis levels by the end of QE1. Overall, these results 
show that the phases of QE had significant settling effects on the volatility of the gilt-edged 
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market, that had risen by as much as 600 percent before the start of QE1. This is consistent with 
QE operating through a signalling channel. 
 Our model also examines the impact on volatility of the announcements of the monthly 
decisions of the MPC, and of specific announcements relating to QE. Except for three ultra-short 
term gilts, the announcements of the results of the MPC meetings appear to have an amplifying 
effect on the volatility of the gilts. This suggests that the results of the meetings themselves do 
not appear to resolve uncertainty in the immediate term, and so gilt volatility spikes up. This 
could reflect the switch to the use by the MPC of unconventional policy measures during the 
sample that arose because the scope to use conventional measures – reducing the interest rate – 
was limited. The reduction in volatility observed for the three ultra-short term gilts that are 
nearing maturity may well be due to a pull-to-par effect, whereby volume focuses on the bonds 
not about to expire. In section 3.4 below, we also show that the volatility reduction for the ultra-
short term gilts could reflect the relatively small amount of their stock that is purchased during 
phases of QE. Specific announcements relating to QE appear to affect the volatility of only a few 
of the gilts in the sample and then only marginally significantly. The small impact of these 
announcements in this data is most likely due to the frequency of observation being too low to 
capture the effects. QE announcements have been shown to affect average yields using intra-day 
data, see Joyce and Tong (2012). 
 While this observation frequency consideration may also impact upon the effects on 
volatility of the days of the purchase auctions that comprise the activity of QE, rather more clear 
patterns are observed in these cases. Specifically, the volatility of ultra-short term gilts appears to 
reduce significantly on days of purchase auctions, whether or not they are being purchased. As 
they do not seem to respond in addition to their specific purchases, this also may indicate a 
switch of trading activity away from these soon to mature bonds into longer term bonds. As 
longer term bonds have greater convexity, the drop in yields caused by QE purchases is likely to 
have a bigger impact on the prices of longer term bonds making them more attractive relative to 
very short term bonds. This could explain the drop in volatility of ultra-short term bonds on these 
days. The short term bonds appear to increase in volatility on APF days in general, but then 
significantly decrease – to an overall lower level – on days on which they themselves are 
purchased. In sub-section 3.4, we explain this in terms of the levels of purchase activity and 
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excess supply into the auction. Medium and longer term bond return volatility does not seem to 
respond to days of purchase activity, but this effect may need higher frequency data to be 
detected. Similarly, the effects on volatility of bond issuance are confined to a small number of 
bonds. A small number of bonds of across the range of maturities experience significant falls in 
return volatility on days that they experience a secondary offering. The short term bonds 
(including the ultra-short term bonds) respond more generally to issuance activity in the market 
experiencing a significant reduction in volatility on these days.  
3.3 Pre-announcement anticipation in volatility 
 Although the graphs in Figure 5 appear to show that volatility rose over the period before 
QE1, it is possible that this could disguise some short term anticipation of QE announcements 
that could lead to a drop in volatility slightly ahead of the start of QE. The results of the event 
study type method that we used to examine this possibility are shown in Table 7. In the period 
immediately preceding the announcement by the Bank of England of the establishment of an 
asset purchase facility (in January 2009, two months before the announcement of QE1), there is 
evidence that there was an anticipatory reduction in bond volatility. Although only statistically 
significant when using the 20 day event window, there are greater than 100 percent reductions in 
bond volatility observed over these pre-announcement periods. It is clear though that, as found 
with prior event studies of the effects of QE, there is strong dependence of the results on the 
event window. This is particularly so ahead of the announcement of QE1, where the forty day 
event window indicates a significant increase in volatility ahead of this announcement. Shorter 
window lengths indicate a decrease, but not significantly. A similar, window dependent, result is 
obtained ahead of QE2 where now the 20-day window indicates a significant increase. Ahead of 
QE3, however, there appears consensus that any near-term anticipation of QE3 raised volatility. 
So, it is only really the case that volatility dropped in anticipation of the first signs of policy 
action. By contrast, the rise in volatility ahead of QE3 may reflect a concern that phases of QE 
were continuing to return and that economic recovery was taking longer than previously 
anticipated. 
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3.4 The sensitivity of volatility to bond characteristics 
These results in Table 6 have been presented by maturity category, but there are other differences 
among the bonds that could be explaining the sensitivity of volatility to the phases of QE, 
announcements and purchase and issuance activity. Table 8 presents the results of cross section 
regressions that attempt to explain which are the characteristics of a bond that make it more 
susceptible to changes volatility during the financial crisis and the phases of QE. During the first 
period of QE, gilts that have both greater time to maturity and higher coupons experience greater 
effects upon volatility relative to the pre-crisis. Bonds that experience relatively more purchase 
activity are also likely to experience higher volatility sensitivity during QE1 than was the case 
beforehand. However, those bonds that holders most wished to sell to the Bank of England, were 
the ones least likely to experience rises in volatility sensitivity during QE1. In the QE2 period, 
bonds with longer time to maturity and greater purchase activity are also more likely to 
experience higher volatility sensitivity than in the pre-crisis period. Furthermore, the more 
supply available for the Bank to purchase the higher the volatility sensitivity is likely to be 
during QE2. This effect is also seen during QE3. During the period of time between the run on 
Northern Rock bank and the start of QE1, increases in volatility are more likely to arise for 
bonds with greater coupon levels. 
 Bonds are more likely to experience an increase in volatility on days that they are 
purchased by the Bank if they are generally experiencing greater relative purchase activity and 
there is an excess supply into the purchase auction process. However, this excess supply variable 
has the reverse effect with regards to days when purchase activity is taking place but may not 
include the bond in question. Taken together, these two features can explain the volatility decline 
that is seen for short term bonds and that is absent for medium and longer term bonds. Short term 
bonds are characterized by relatively smaller excess supply, the principal component variable 
that captures the excess supply effect – described in Section 2.3, typically takes negative values 
for short term bonds but positive values for medium to longer term bonds. The positive 
relationship between excess supply and volatility, on days of own-purchase activity, in Table 8, 
means that the relatively small excess supply of short term bonds into auctions is reducing the 
volatility impact of own-purchases. On general APF days, the short term bonds displayed an 
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increase in volatility, which is consistent with the relatively small excess supply and the negative 
relationship between excess supply and volatility found on APF days. 
Volatility is more likely to increase on days of the announcements of the decisions of the 
MPC, if the bond has a longer time to maturity and experiences greater purchase activity. As the 
two shortest of the ultra-short term bonds experience substantially less purchase activity than 
most of the other bonds, this could explain the reduction in volatility seen for these two bonds on 
days of MPC announcements. Most other bonds experienced a rise (not always significant as the 
usual levels) and this would then be consistent with the greater relative purchase activity for 
these other issues. The effects on volatility of specific announcements relating to QE do not seem 
to differ by the characteristics of the bond. The volatility of bonds on days of issuance, either of 
their own or other issues, is more likely to be higher if they experience relatively less issuance. 
This indicates that relatively unusual issuance is viewed with caution and the volatility effects 
may be reflecting significant changes in the liquidity of the bond. 
 Overall, these results suggest, as expected, that bonds with greater maturity tend to have 
more volatile response to shocks. The effects of QE on volatility respond to the purchase activity 
and the excess supply of stock into the auction process, but these effects change across the QE 
periods, consistent with the market becoming more adaptable to the purchase activity. The 
amount of purchase activity is also the key factor in determining how volatility responds to days 
of purchase auctions and also announcements by the MPC. Volatility is also affected by 
issuance, and seems to respond more strongly for bonds which see relatively fewer issuance 
events. 
3.5 Gilt volatility and the money supply 
The results, in Table 9, of the Granger-causality tests between the money supply and gilt 
volatility present a mixed picture, depending upon the significance level applied and to a lesser 
extent upon the maturity of the bond. At a one percent level of significance, only four out of the 
24 gilts display evidence of causality from the money supply to gilt volatility. At a five percent 
level, five further gilts display causation from the money supply to gilt volatility. At a 10 percent 
level, a total of 11 of the gilts display causation from the money supply to gilt volatility. At this 
level of significance, there are many instances where the null hypothesis of no-causation is 
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rejected in both directions. So, overall, with fewer than half of the gilts displaying significant 
unidirectional causation from the money supply, even at a 10 percent level, it is difficult to 
conclude that the evolution of the money supply can explain the volatility changes induced by 
the phases of QE. This further suggests that both the money supply and gilt volatility were 
responding to the unconventional monetary policy action, but that there was little supplementary 
causation from the money supply to gilt volatility. However, we note that causation is strongest 
among short and medium term bonds, where we found earlier (Table 6) that gilt volatility 
remained relatively high during QE1. This perhaps suggests that the portfolio balance channel of 
QE was at work with these bonds. Overall, these results suggest that it is most likely that gilt 
volatility was responding primarily to the signalling channel of QE, whereby QE is interpreted as 
a means of calming market turbulence, rather than responding to portfolio rebalancing effects.11  
4. Conclusion 
 The UK bond market, the gilt-edged market, has been the prime instrument through 
which the Bank of England, as the UK’s monetary authority, has operated its policy of 
quantitative easing, QE. This has been done with little apparent concern for the welfare of the 
gilt market itself, since it has been regarded as a robust market place, for example, 
“Nor were its (the MPC) actions focussed on improving the functioning of gilt 
markets where liquidity premia, even in stressed times, were considered to be 
small.” (Joyce et al, 2011) 
 
However, QE is an unconventional monetary policy, and its likely effects on the gilt edged 
market itself were unknown. This paper has examined one aspect of the possible effects of QE 
on the gilt-edged market, the effect on volatility. 
 The onset of the financial crisis that, for the gilt-edged market, appears to date from the 
run on the Northern Rock bank in September 2007, saw a hugely significant rise in the volatility 
of individual gilts, across the maturity spectrum. The effects were particularly large among 
longer term bonds, where a six fold increase from pre-crisis levels was not unusual. Indication 
that this was potentially causing some liquidity stress in the market is provided by Joyce et al 
                                                          
11. A similar argument has been made by Steeley (2014) in the context of the effects of QE on the gilt yield curve, where it 
appears that signalling channel effects are more pronounced than portfolio balance effects.  
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(2011) who report that average bid-ask spreads increased three-fold in the period between 
September 2007 and March 2009. 
 Modelling the conditional volatility of individual gilt returns, using a GARCH model, we 
find that the onset of QE led to a reduction in this volatility across the maturity spectrum. For 
ultra-short term bonds and long term bonds, the activity associated with QE1 reduced volatility 
back to pre-crisis levels. For short and medium term bonds, volatility also reduced but remained 
at a level significantly above the pre-crisis level, even after the QE1 phase had completed. 
However, the subsequent rounds of QE, reduced the volatility of all individual bonds further, so 
that the volatility of all individual gilts was at or below the pre-crisis level. Furthermore, we find 
some evidence that volatility began to decrease in anticipation of unconventional monetary 
policy being adopted in the UK. 
 We used a cross section regression model to identify which bonds were more or less 
likely to experience volatility changes as a result of the financial crisis and the phases of QE. As 
would be expected the longer maturity bonds demonstrated a greater volatility sensitivity, but 
other factors had an influence also. Bonds that experienced the most purchase auction activity 
were the ones less likely to see significant reductions in volatility during QE. However, this 
effect was mostly observed during the first phase of QE indicating that the market became more 
adept at accommodating the purchase activity as the monetary authority interventions continued. 
Where counterparties offered relatively more for sale than was purchased by the Bank of 
England, these gilts were more likely to experience a decrease in volatility as a result of QE. 
 The relative amount of purchase activity that an individual gilt experienced during QE 
also affected its volatility response on the days of the purchase auction activity, although only a 
relatively small number of bonds showed any volatility response to these event days. These 
effects and those of days of bond issuance were primarily confined to shorter term bonds. The 
response of volatility to a bond having further issuance (a secondary offering) seems to depend 
on the extent to which such issuance is unusual. Bonds experiencing regular and relatively larger 
issuance appear to accommodate this activity without affecting volatility. Bonds with infrequent 
and relatively small issuance seem to experience greater volatility impacts. 
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 To establish the transmission mechanism through which unconventional monetary policy 
was affecting gilt volatility, we examined the causal relationship between the money supply and 
gilt volatility. We found little evidence to indicate that changes in the money supply were 
causing the observed changes in gilt volatility. This suggests that QE’s effects on the volatility in 
the gilt market were not primarily operating through a portfolio balance channel.  
 Overall, the effects of QE on bond market volatility are positive. The market appeared to 
be experiencing unusually high levels of volatility in the immediately preceding two years, and 
these were reduced across the maturity spectrum by the activities of QE. While short and 
medium term bonds took three phases of QE to restore pre-crisis levels of volatility, the 
secondary market liquidity effects of the purchase auctions that comprise QE have restored the 
volatility of the gilt-edged market to its pre-crisis state. This volatility reduction induced by QE 
is, however, consistent with both the signalling and liquidity channels of QE, where enhanced 
liquidity coupled with a strong monetary easing signal has led to renewed calm in the gilt 
market. 
So, while QE has been operating on the wider financial and economic system through the 
gilt-edged market it has also had the beneficial side effect of restoring the volatility of the market 
to pre-crisis levels. This is important because the stated aim of UK debt management policy is:  
“to minimise over the long term, the costs of meeting the Government’s 
financing needs, taking into account risk, whilst ensuring that debt 
management policy is consistent with the aims of monetary policy”. (UK Debt 
Management Office, 2013). 
 
If QE had left the volatility of the gilt-edged market above pre-crisis levels, then the financial 
crisis could have had a permanent effect on the cost of debt issuance. By restoring volatility to 
pre-crisis levels, QE has ensured that this has not been the case.  
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Table 1: Key QE Announcements relating to UK government bonds 
Announcement 
date 
Decision on QE Other decisions 
19 January 2009 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer announces that the 
Bank of England will set up an asset purchase 
programme 
 
30 January 2009 
Asset Purchase Facility Fund established. Exchange of 
letters between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
the Governor on 29 January 2009. 
 
11 February 2009 
Bank of England’s February Inflation Report and the 
associated press conference give strong indication that 
QE asset purchases are likely. 
 
5 March 2009 
The MPC announces it will purchase £75 billion of 
assets over three months funded by central bank 
money. Conventional bonds likely to constitute the 
majority of  purchases, restricted to bonds with residual 
maturity between 5 and 25 years. 
Base rate reduced from 1% to 
0.5%. 
11 March 2009 First purchases of UK government bonds (gilts).  
7 May 2009 
The MPC announces that the amount of QE asset 
purchases will be extended by a further £50 billion to 
£125 billion. 
 
6 August 2009 
The MPC announces that QE asset purchases will be 
extended to £175 billion and that the buying range will 
be extended to gilts with a residual maturity greater 
than three years, and split between maturity ranges: 3-
10 years, 10 to 25 years, and more than 25 years.  
The Bank announces a gilt 
lending programme, which 
allows counterparties to borrow 
gilts from the APF’s portfolio 
via the DMO in return for a fee 
and alternative gilts as 
collateral. 
5 November 2009 The MPC announced that the amount of QE asset purchases would be extended to £200 billion. 
 
4 February 2010 
The MPC announced that the amount of QE asset 
purchases would be maintained at £200 billion. 
The MPC’s press statement 
said that the committee would 
continue to monitor the 
appropriate scale of the asset 
purchase programme and that 
further purchases would be 
made should the outlook 
warrant them. 
6 October 2011 
The MPC announces that the amount of QE asset 
purchases will be extended by £75 billion to £275 
billion. The start of QE2. 
 
9 February 2012 
The MPC announces that the amount of QE asset 
purchases will be extended by a further £50 billion to 
£325 billion. 
The maturity range boundaries 
are changed from 10 and 25 
years to 7 and 15 years. 
5 July 2012 
The MPC announces that the amount of QE asset 
purchases will be extended by £50 billion to £375 
billion. The start of QE3. 
 
Source: Joyce at al (2011) and Joyce et al (2012). 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
This table contains summary statistics for daily returns (daily change in log clean price) for the gilts for the sample period 02/01/04 – 08/05/13, 2362 observations. Gilts with 
fewer observations were issued, redeemed, or both within the sample period. Quartile refers to the quartile of the returns distribution. Skew is the skewness of returns. Kurtosis 
is excess kurtosis. Zeros counts the number of zero daily returns in the period. No. Obs. is the number of observations available for the bond within the sample. Statistical 
significance, with a zero null hypothesis, at 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *,** and ***, respectively. 
Bond Name No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Quartile 1 Median Quartile 3 Maximum Skewness Kurtosis Zeros 
TRSY 4.5% 2013 1264 -0.00001 0.00187 -0.01142 -0.00048 -0.00010 0.00056 0.01137 -0.093 7.409*** 83 
TRSY 8% 2013 2362 -0.00008* 0.00202 -0.01045 -0.00097 -0.00018 0.00089 0.01157 0.027 3.266*** 56 
TRSY 5% 2014 2362 0.00002 0.00245 -0.01134 -0.00116 0.00000 0.00136 0.01106 -0.035 2.369*** 72 
TRSY 4.75% 2015 2362 0.00005 0.00281 -0.01229 -0.00149 0.00000 0.00159 0.01665 -0.008 2.509*** 40 
TRSY 8% 2015 2362 -0.00003 0.00270 -0.01205 -0.00150 -0.00008 0.00148 0.01857 0.085* 2.983*** 36 
TRSY 4% 2016 1820 0.00007 0.00321 -0.01376 -0.00167 0.00000 0.00179 0.02022 0.119** 3.199*** 27 
TRSY 8.75% 2017 2362 -0.00001 0.00322 -0.01630 -0.00184 -0.00007 0.00187 0.02317 0.111** 2.996*** 22 
TRSY 5% 2018 1505 0.00013 0.00388 -0.01865 -0.00193 0.00009 0.00239 0.02317 0.060 2.768*** 23 
TRSY4.5% 2019 1165 0.00016 0.00420 -0.01927 -0.00223 0.00009 0.00258 0.02468 0.232*** 2.967*** 22 
TRSY 4.75% 2020 2055 0.00010 0.00420 -0.01952 -0.00243 0.00010 0.00275 0.02385 0.049 1.695*** 13 
TRSY 8% 2021 2362 0.00004 0.00410 -0.01934 -0.00241 0.00007 0.00263 0.02346 0.042 1.663*** 17 
TRSY 4% 2022 1065 0.00015 0.00497 -0.02324 -0.00306 0.00019 0.00322 0.02570 0.100 1.788*** 13 
TRSY 5% 2025 2362 0.00010 0.00526 -0.02649 -0.00294 0.00018 0.00334 0.05156 0.483*** 6.778*** 18 
TRSY 4.25% 2027 1686 0.00012 0.00641 -0.03082 -0.00350 0.00000 0.00394 0.06228 0.639*** 8.077*** 23 
TRSY 6% 2028 2362 0.00009 0.00575 -0.02990 -0.00309 0.00017 0.00358 0.05836 0.493*** 7.227*** 24 
TRSY 4.75% 2030 1414 0.00018 0.00716 -0.03210 -0.00388 0.00019 0.00447 0.06312 0.499*** 6.434*** 16 
TRSY 4.25% 2032 2362 0.00011 0.00663 -0.03401 -0.00365 0.00020 0.00410 0.06691 0.438*** 6.734*** 24 
TRSY 4.25% 2036 2362 0.00011 0.00702 -0.03621 -0.00398 0.00020 0.00433 0.05472 0.126** 3.365*** 18 
TRSY 4.75% 2038 2293 0.00011 0.00720 -0.03474 -0.00414 0.00019 0.00440 0.05074 0.068 2.698*** 17 
TRSY 4.25% 2039 1054 0.00019 0.00800 -0.03011 -0.00473 0.00005 0.00487 0.04848 0.216*** 1.743*** 2 
TRSY 4.25% 2042 1498 0.00016 0.00861 -0.03399 -0.00500 0.00010 0.00528 0.05147 0.036 1.885*** 12 
TRSY 4.25% 2046 1767 0.00010 0.00876 -0.03608 -0.00512 0.00000 0.00515 0.05485 0.066 2.072*** 15 
TRSY 4.25% 2049 1182 0.00018 0.01006 -0.03682 -0.00589 0.00000 0.00596 0.05564 0.066 1.626*** 8 
TRSY 4.25% 2055 2009 0.00010 0.00934 -0.03947 -0.00539 0.00009 0.00544 0.05784 0.066 2.091*** 6 
Gilt Index 2362 0.00011 0.00696 -0.03285 -0.00384 0.00022 0.00421 0.05678 0.115** 2.819*** 5 
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Table 3: Autocorrelation statistics for returns 
This table contains autocorrelation coefficients for daily returns for lags 1 to 5, AC(1),...,AC(5), and the probability values associated Box 
and Ljung (1978) portmanteau Q-statistics for the sample of gilts described in Table 2. 
Bond Name AC(1) AC(2) AC(3) AC(4) AC(5) Q(1)p Q(2)p Q(3)p Q4(p) Q5(p) 
TRSY 4.5% 2013 0.0552 0.0100 -0.0089 -0.0029 -0.0491 0.049 0.136 0.252 0.392 0.208 
TRSY 8% 2013 0.0490 -0.0128 -0.0067 0.0229 -0.0187 0.017 0.048 0.103 0.115 0.143 
TRSY 5% 2014 0.0371 -0.0281 -0.0046 0.0331 -0.0236 0.072 0.077 0.160 0.101 0.106 
TRSY 4.75% 2015 0.0442 -0.0302 -0.0104 0.0375 -0.0202 0.031 0.034 0.071 0.035 0.045 
TRSY 8% 2015 0.0484 -0.0273 -0.0054 0.0422 -0.0178 0.019 0.026 0.061 0.021 0.031 
TRSY 4% 2016 0.0384 -0.0162 0.0001 0.0492 -0.0215 0.101 0.205 0.366 0.108 0.134 
TRSY 8.75% 2017 0.0500 -0.0456 -0.0126 0.0448 -0.0109 0.015 0.004 0.011 0.003 0.006 
TRSY 5% 2018 0.0507 -0.0406 -0.0165 0.0469 -0.0193 0.049 0.041 0.079 0.039 0.058 
TRSY4.5% 2019 0.0746 -0.0718 -0.0053 0.0621 -0.0139 0.011 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.004 
TRSY 4.75% 2020 0.0359 -0.0416 -0.0355 0.0449 -0.0071 0.103 0.045 0.032 0.011 0.023 
TRSY 8% 2021 0.0346 -0.0502 -0.0358 0.0439 -0.0076 0.092 0.012 0.008 0.003 0.005 
TRSY 4% 2022 0.0287 -0.0996 -0.0467 0.0484 -0.0145 0.348 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 
TRSY 5% 2025 0.0567 -0.0705 -0.0523 0.0534 0.0044 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TRSY 4.25% 2027 0.0743 -0.0752 -0.0592 0.0632 0.0087 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TRSY 6% 2028 0.0588 -0.0698 -0.0619 0.0545 0.0155 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TRSY 4.75% 2030 0.0751 -0.0908 -0.0691 0.0680 0.0123 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TRSY 4.25% 2032 0.0647 -0.0864 -0.0683 0.0581 0.0115 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TRSY 4.25% 2036 0.0590 -0.0889 -0.0825 0.0522 0.0054 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TRSY 4.75% 2038 0.0579 -0.0949 -0.0933 0.0553 0.0028 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TRSY 4.25% 2039 0.0291 -0.1168 -0.1149 0.0563 0.0130 0.345 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TRSY 4.25% 2042 0.0628 -0.1041 -0.1034 0.0606 -0.0012 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TRSY 4.25% 2046 0.0527 -0.0938 -0.1060 0.0532 -0.0036 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TRSY 4.25% 2049 0.0882 -0.1281 -0.1106 0.0712 0.0032 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TRSY 4.25% 2055 0.0621 -0.1040 -0.1141 0.0545 -0.0035 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Gilt Index 0.0523 -0.0993 -0.0828 0.0431 0.0094 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 4: Autocorrelation statistics for squared returns 
This table contains autocorrelation coefficients for daily squared returns for lags 1 to 5, AC(1),…,AC(5), and the associated Box and 
Ljung (1978) portmanteau Q-statistics for the sample of gilts described in Table 2. All of the reported Q-statistics are statistically 
significant (p<0.001). 
Bond Name AC(1) AC(2) AC(3) AC(4) AC(5) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
TRSY 4.5% 2013 0.1780 0.2030 0.1835 0.2113 0.2949 40.15 92.38 135.14 191.84 302.37 
TRSY 8% 2013 0.1224 0.1195 0.1230 0.1607 0.2477 35.45 69.21 105.04 166.19 311.50 
TRSY 5% 2014 0.1530 0.0851 0.1009 0.1476 0.1954 55.35 72.50 96.58 148.18 238.64 
TRSY 4.75% 2015 0.1940 0.0566 0.0689 0.1129 0.1880 89.01 96.60 107.85 138.02 221.75 
TRSY 8% 2015 0.2331 0.0475 0.0672 0.1022 0.1737 128.50 133.84 144.53 169.26 240.78 
TRSY 4% 2016 0.2670 0.0623 0.0617 0.1152 0.2197 129.97 137.04 143.98 168.19 256.41 
TRSY 8.75% 2017 0.2462 0.0473 0.0535 0.0968 0.1608 143.32 148.61 155.38 177.56 238.80 
TRSY 5% 2018 0.2628 0.0489 0.0403 0.0967 0.1979 104.13 107.74 110.19 124.32 183.54 
TRSY4.5% 2019 0.2637 0.0472 0.0301 0.0918 0.1859 81.23 83.84 84.90 94.77 135.25 
TRSY 4.75% 2020 0.2160 0.0380 0.0420 0.0776 0.1527 96.03 99.01 102.65 115.06 163.16 
TRSY 8% 2021 0.2058 0.0408 0.0485 0.0683 0.1378 100.19 104.13 109.69 120.75 165.71 
TRSY 4% 2022 0.2229 0.0286 0.0381 0.0464 0.0904 53.05 53.92 55.47 57.78 66.55 
TRSY 5% 2025 0.4201 0.0767 0.0322 0.0897 0.1028 417.47 431.38 433.83 452.89 477.92 
TRSY 4.25% 2027 0.4181 0.0740 0.0261 0.1010 0.0993 295.28 304.53 305.68 322.95 339.64 
TRSY 6% 2028 0.4024 0.0835 0.0342 0.1058 0.1049 382.98 399.47 402.24 428.74 454.82 
TRSY 4.75% 2030 0.4119 0.0853 0.0289 0.0868 0.0877 240.44 250.76 251.95 262.64 273.57 
TRSY 4.25% 2032 0.3946 0.1042 0.0481 0.1047 0.0965 368.24 393.91 399.38 425.36 447.40 
TRSY 4.25% 2036 0.3485 0.1385 0.0938 0.1151 0.1215 287.24 332.61 353.45 384.82 419.78 
TRSY 4.75% 2038 0.3224 0.1517 0.1197 0.1307 0.1361 238.70 291.57 324.51 363.76 406.35 
TRSY 4.25% 2039 0.1268 0.0479 0.0710 0.0789 0.0215 17.01 19.43 24.76 31.36 31.85 
TRSY 4.25% 2042 0.2948 0.1505 0.1181 0.1301 0.1290 130.43 164.46 185.43 210.90 235.93 
TRSY 4.25% 2046 0.2967 0.1662 0.1371 0.1457 0.1360 155.76 204.70 238.00 275.65 308.44 
TRSY 4.25% 2049 0.2736 0.1403 0.1146 0.1268 0.1171 88.73 112.07 127.66 146.77 163.07 
TRSY 4.25% 2055 0.2820 0.1764 0.1523 0.1726 0.1383 160.01 222.65 269.36 329.43 367.97 
Gilt Index 0.3328 0.1288 0.0877 0.1306 0.1291 261.98 301.26 319.48 359.88 399.37 
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Table 5: Estimated parameters on the bond market event indicators in the mean return equation 
This table contains maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters, , i=1,2,…,14, from the conditional mean equation of the following model applied to the daily returns of gilts,  , using the 
samples indicated in Table 2. 
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 The set of dummy variables, ,, entering both the conditional mean and conditional variance specifications, are indicators of the effects of the three separate phases of QE (QE1, QE2, QE3), the 
period of time between the run on Northern Rock and the start of QE1 (N-Rock), days of announcements relating specifically to QE (QE Ann), days of announcements of the decision of MPC 
meetings, days on which the bond was issued (Own Issue) or purchased by the Bank of England through the QE Asset Purchase Facility (Own Purchase), days that any bond was issued (Issue) and 
days that any bond was purchased by the Bank of England through the QE Asset Purchase Facility (APF), or of other differences related to days of the week (Tues, Wed, Thur, Fri). The reported 
estimates of the parameters  , i=1,2,…,14, have all been multiplied by 103. Below the parameter estimates are robust t-statistics in parentheses. The table is divided into the official maturity 
classifications at the end of the sample. 
 
Own Issue Own Purchase Issue APF QE Ann MPC N-Rock QE1 QE2 QE3 TUES WED THUR FRI 
Ultra-Short-term Gilts 
TRSY 4.5% 2013 0.379 -0.610 0.140 0.155 0.399 0.117 0.340 -0.093 -0.195 -0.176 0.0676 0.1080 0.0126 -0.1750 
 
(0.64) (-1.41) (0.69) (0.51) (0.64) (0.35) (1.18) (-0.32) (-0.49) (-0.20) (0.21) (0.33) (0.04) (-0.53) 
TRSY 8% 2013 0.924 -0.502 0.198 0.332 0.901 0.322 0.296 -0.210 -0.349 -0.328 0.100 0.045 0.015 -0.073 
 
(1.59) (-0.93) (1.14) (1.07) (1.41) (1.27) (1.61) (-0.95) (-1.33) (-0.67) (0.41) (0.18) (0.06) (-0.30) 
TRSY 5% 2014 0.214 0.183 0.198 0.259 0.792 0.435 0.360 -0.411 -0.346 -0.308 -0.022 -0.112 -0.139 0.052 
 
(0.29) (0.22) (0.94) (0.80) (0.97) (1.37) (1.59) (-1.58) (-1.11) (-0.77) (-0.07) (-0.38) (-0.45) (0.18) 
TRSY 4.75% 2015 0.219 -0.473 0.210 0.493 1.408 0.414 0.376 -0.448 -0.364 -0.392 -0.101 -0.193 -0.163 0.059 
 
(0.40) (-1.19) (1.03) (1.60) (1.44) (1.17) (1.48) (-1.49) (-1.46) (-1.23) (-0.33) (-0.66) (-0.50) (0.19) 
TRSY 8% 2015 0.274 -0.015 0.150 0.159 1.024 0.132 0.345 -0.308 -0.096 -0.161 -0.075 -0.092 -0.087 -0.179 
 
(0.58) (-0.05) (1.16) (1.17) (1.12) (0.57) (1.52) (-1.32) (-0.66) (-1.59) (-0.58) (-0.67) (-0.59) (-1.22) 
Short-term Gilts 
TRSY 4% 2016 -1.438 -0.380 0.366 0.711 2.452 0.095 0.388 -0.635 -0.346 -0.277 -0.250 -0.327 -0.238 -0.094 
 
(-2.25) (-0.82) (1.29) (1.68) (2.75) (0.22) (1.27) (-1.81) (-0.96) (-0.60) (-0.62) (-0.86) (-0.55) (-0.22) 
TRSY 8.75% 2017 0.504 -0.169 0.126 0.536 1.425 0.283 0.326 -0.567 -0.306 -0.169 -0.185 -0.271 -0.308 -0.155 
 
(0.62) (-0.34) (0.70) (2.09) (1.03) (0.94) (1.25) (-1.84) (-1.22) (-1.06) (-0.67) (-0.99) (-1.08) (-0.56) 
TRSY 5% 2018 0.753 -0.318 -0.064 0.560 1.876 -0.448 0.122 -0.577 -0.384 -0.321 -0.494 -0.479 -0.394 -0.260 
 
(0.67) (-0.78) (-0.27) (2.00) (1.63) (-1.42) (0.42) (-1.77) (-1.38) (-1.74) (-1.71) (-1.71) (-1.44) (-0.87) 
TRSY4.5% 2019 1.626 -0.327 -0.195 0.961 1.078 -0.351 0.815 -0.990 -0.568 -0.413 -0.670 -0.638 -0.543 -0.209 
 
(0.99) (-0.49) (-0.70) (2.46) (0.62) (-0.66) (1.11) (-2.46) (-1.51) (-1.63) (-1.31) (-1.24) (-1.00) (-0.39) 
TRSY 4.75% 2020 0.221 0.583 0.132 0.758 1.576 0.183 0.192 -0.786 -0.461 -0.404 -0.365 -0.392 -0.370 -0.102 
 
(0.26) (1.05) (0.47) (2.23) (0.82) (0.37) (0.61) (-2.10) (-1.24) (-1.65) (-1.49) (-1.51) (-1.32) (-0.39) 
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Table 5 cont.: Estimated parameters on the bond market event indicators in the mean return equation 
This table contains maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters, , i=1,2,…,14, from the conditional mean equation of the following model applied to the daily returns of gilts,  , using the 
samples indicated in Table 2. 
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 The set of dummy variables, ,, entering both the conditional mean and conditional variance specifications, are indicators of the effects of the three separate phases of QE (QE1, QE2, QE3), the 
period of time between the run on Northern Rock and the start of QE1 (N-Rock), days of announcements relating specifically to QE (QE Ann), days of announcements of the decision of MPC 
meetings, days on which the bond was issued (Own Issue) or purchased by the Bank of England through the QE Asset Purchase Facility (Own Purchase), days that any bond was issued (Issue) and 
days that any bond was purchased by the Bank of England through the QE Asset Purchase Facility (APF), or of other differences related to days of the week (Tues, Wed, Thur, Fri). The reported 
estimates of the parameters  , i=1,2,…,14, have all been multiplied by 103. Below the parameter estimates are robust t-statistics in parentheses. The table is divided into the official maturity 
classifications at the end of the sample. 
Medium-term Gilts 
 Own Issue Own Purchase Issue APF QE Ann MPC N-Rock QE1 QE2 QE3 TUES WED THUR FRI 
TRSY 8% 2021 -0.156 2.328 0.129 1.010 1.617 0.253 0.225 -0.938 -0.404 -0.499 -0.244 -0.295 -0.282 0.041 
 
(-0.31) (1.34) (0.45) (2.71) (0.93) (0.56) (0.75) (-2.49) (-0.98) (-1.81) (-1.04) (-1.18) (-1.08) (0.16) 
TRSY 4% 2022 0.424 -0.054 -0.474 1.285 1.693 -0.439 0.668 -1.156 -0.759 -0.623 -0.939 -1.047 -0.656 0.103 
 
(0.25) (-0.06) (-1.09) (2.45) (0.94) (-0.54) (0.19) (-2.38) (-1.43) (-1.64) (-1.77) (-1.80) (-1.09) (0.18) 
TRSY 5% 2025 -0.369 0.135 0.350 1.221 2.394 0.188 0.130 -0.788 -0.598 -0.446 -0.315 -0.720 -0.274 0.049 
 
(-0.26) (0.16) (0.94) (1.96) (1.43) (0.35) (0.38) (-1.81) (-1.09) (-1.18) (-1.01) (-2.22) (-0.83) (0.15) 
TRSY 4.25% 2027 1.346 1.128 0.316 1.184 2.458 -0.314 0.082 -0.900 -0.660 -0.590 -0.919 -1.093 -0.611 -0.121 
 
(1.00) (1.24) (0.65) (1.79) (1.21) (-0.42) (0.20) (-1.70) (-1.01) (-1.27) (-2.12) (-2.39) (-1.31) (-0.26) 
Long-term Gilts 
TRSY 6% 2028 1.300 1.591 0.189 1.049 1.256 0.166 -0.003 -0.957 -0.759 -0.586 -0.317 -0.587 -0.227 0.271 
 
(0.57) (1.74) (0.46) (1.60) (0.68) (0.30) (-0.01) (-1.88) (-1.20) (-1.35) (-0.96) (-1.69) (-0.65) (0.77) 
TRSY 4.75% 2030 1.261 1.544 -0.151 1.708 0.688 0.049 -0.220 -1.422 -1.266 -1.202 -1.373 -1.282 -0.458 0.227 
 
(0.75) (1.74) (-0.26) (2.44) (0.31) (0.05) (-0.47) (-2.33) (-1.76) (-2.21) (-2.69) (-2.27) (-0.79) (0.40) 
TRSY 4.25% 2032 0.655 1.324 0.272 1.485 1.653 0.069 -0.070 -1.133 -1.008 -0.710 -0.310 -0.704 -0.119 0.417 
 
(0.31) (1.20) (0.58) (2.03) (0.81) (0.11) (-0.17) (-1.98) (-1.30) (-1.43) (-0.81) (-1.79) (-0.30) (1.04) 
TRSY 4.25% 2036 -0.614 0.400 0.286 1.991 2.241 0.010 -0.101 -1.085 -1.216 -0.768 -0.303 -0.819 -0.082 0.443 
 
(-0.26) (0.33) (0.57) (2.51) (1.16) (0.01) (-0.23) (-1.79) (-1.48) (-1.42) (-0.72) (-1.93) (-0.19) (1.03) 
TRSY 4.75% 2038 -1.793 2.044 0.378 1.703 1.813 -0.160 -0.091 -1.211 -1.331 -0.911 -0.583 -0.809 -0.047 0.450 
 
(-1.36) (1.75) (0.72) (2.12) (0.79) (-0.23) (-0.21) (-1.91) (-1.59) (-1.67) (-1.42) (-1.96) (-0.11) (1.06) 
TRSY 4.25% 2039 -1.887 2.893 -0.638 1.641 1.065 -0.875 4.828 -1.376 -1.483 -1.336 -2.628 -2.223 -1.219 0.029 
 
(-1.41) (2.25) (-0.84) (2.02) (0.34) (-0.60) (0.33) (-1.92) (-1.71) (-2.06) (-3.52) (-3.06) (-1.53) (0.04) 
TRSY 4.5% 2042 -1.327 2.745 -0.168 1.810 1.945 -1.053 -0.324 -1.420 -1.741 -1.203 -1.852 -1.797 -0.151 0.246 
 
(-0.54) (2.10) (-0.23) (2.02) (0.77) (-0.97) (-0.64) (-1.96) (-1.83) (-1.70) (-2.82) (-2.72) (-0.23) (0.37) 
TRSY 4.25% 2046 -1.508 2.652 0.175 1.657 2.319 -0.968 -0.110 -1.134 -1.511 -1.032 -1.384 -1.513 -0.280 0.330 
 
(-0.61) (1.92) (0.27) (1.76) (0.91) (-0.98) (-0.22) (-1.55) (-1.49) (-1.51) (-2.25) (-2.52) (-0.45) (0.54) 
TRSY 4.25% 2049 3.018 3.299 -0.645 1.877 2.296 -0.997 0.003 -1.530 -1.625 -1.214 -2.721 -1.834 -0.890 0.312 
 
(0.75) (2.19) (-0.80) (1.91) (0.72) (-0.65) (0.00) (-1.85) (-1.57) (-1.58) (-3.15) (-2.20) (-0.99) (0.34) 
TRSY 4.25% 2055 3.607 2.868 -0.106 1.532 3.230 -0.641 -0.209 -0.988 -1.566 -0.901 -0.857 -1.091 -0.116 0.655 
 
(1.27) (1.83) (-0.16) (1.48) (1.25) (-0.63) (-0.40) (-1.27) (-1.38) (-1.20) (-1.41) (-1.85) (-0.19) (1.09) 
Gilt Index 
  
-0.478 2.092 -3.357 0.411 -0.073 -0.84 -1.105 -0.762 -0.521 -0.692 -1.106 -0.678 
   
(-1.00) (2.79) (-1.10) (0.55) (-0.17) (-1.46) (-1.28) (-1.40) (-1.40) (-1.76) (-2.67) (-1.59) 
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Table 6: Estimated parameters for a model of conditional volatility with QE and bond market event indicators 
This table contains maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters, 	,  ,   , λ and # , i=1,2,…,14, from the conditional volatility equation of the following model applied to the daily returns of gilts,  , using the 
samples indicated in Table 2. 
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 ,

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, 
, … . ∼ 0, 
    
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
  !"
  #,


 
  
The set of dummy variables, ,, entering both the conditional mean and conditional variance specifications, are indicators of the effects of the three separate phases of QE (QE1, QE2, QE3), the period of time 
between the run on Northern Rock and the start of QE1 (N-Rock), days of announcements relating specifically to QE (QE Ann), days of announcements of the decision of MPC meetings, days on which the bond was 
issued (Own Issue) or purchased by the Bank of England through the QE Asset Purchase Facility (Own Purchase), days that any bond was issued (Issue) and days that any bond was purchased by the Bank of England 
through the QE Asset Purchase Facility (APF), or of other differences related to days of the week (Tues, Wed, Thur, Fri). The indicator variable " takes the value one when 
 $ 0 and is zero otherwise. If λ is not 
significant the model is re-estimated excluding the variable "
 . LogL is the maximized value of the log-likelihood function of the model above. The reported estimates of the parameters  have been multiplied by 
105 and # , i=1,2,…,14, have all been multiplied by 106. Below the parameter estimates are robust t-statistics in parentheses. The table is divided into the official maturity classifications at the end of the sample.  
Gilt Const. 
  
 "
  Own Issue Own Purchase Issue APF QE Ann MPC N-Rock QE1 QE2 QE3 Tues Wed Thur Fri LogL 
Ultra-short-term Gilts 
TRSY 4.5% 2013 0.303 0.150 0.600 
 
0.274 -0.680 -0.707 -0.808 0.263 -1.130 0.120 -0.188 -0.644 -0.671 -1.560 -1.110 -1.330 -1.740 6356.2 
 
(5.03) (4.13) (9.00) 
 
(0.22) (-1.03) (-2.63) (-2.44) (0.34) (-3.00) (0.37) (-0.71) (-2.27) (-2.42) (-2.28) (-1.86) (-2.18) (-2.67) 
 
TRSY 8% 2013 0.352 0.150 0.600 
 
0.362 0.471 -1.140 -0.810 0.648 -1.220 0.647 -0.069 -0.654 -0.689 -1.850 -1.430 -1.570 -2.020 11480.2 
 
(5.21) (3.58) (7.62) 
 
(0.20) (0.33) (-3.50) (-2.10) (0.45) (-2.71) (1.79) (-0.23) (-2.04) (-2.19) (-2.33) (-2.26) (-2.24) (-3.54) 
 
TRSY 5% 2014 0.518 0.150 0.600 
 
-1.037 2.235 -1.516 -1.225 1.028 -1.356 1.037 0.008 -0.967 -1.042 -2.772 -2.450 -2.418 -2.759 10957.3 
 
(5.63) (3.88) (8.14) 
 
(-1.60) (0.84) (-5.43) (-2.48) (0.41) (-2.20) (2.17) (0.02) (-2.02) (-2.24) (-2.41) (-2.52) (-2.47) (-2.83) 
 
TRSY 4.75% 2015 0.680 0.150 0.600 
 
-0.532 -1.980 -1.900 -1.380 1.850 -1.350 1.520 1.200 -1.280 -1.360 -3.690 -3.850 -3.110 -4.010 10645.8 
 
(4.58) (3.86) (9.12) 
 
(-1.09) (-1.74) (-3.92) (-1.96) (0.48) (-1.56) (2.18) (1.76) (-2.27) (-2.21) (-2.41) (-3.06) (-2.21) (-2.61) 
 
TRSY 8% 2015 0.129 0.102 0.605 
 
-0.084 1.133 -0.465 0.045 1.920 0.488 3.212 1.221 -1.260 -1.418 0.382 0.688 0.156 0.702 10938.9 
 
(3.43) (5.14) (8.39) 
 
(-0.09) (1.60) (-2.50) (0.44) (0.80) (1.20) (3.91) (2.49) (-4.30) (-4.37) (1.53) (3.04) (0.75) (2.11) 
 
Short-term Gilts  
TRSY 4% 2016 0.900 0.150 0.600 
 
-3.172 -2.483 -1.849 -1.741 1.825 -2.847 0.214 -0.169 -2.202 -1.652 -4.273 -4.332 -3.605 -4.351 7911.5 
 
(4.26) (3.96) (7.21) 
 
(-2.43) (-1.15) (-1.85) (-1.33) (0.59) (-1.92) (0.27) (-0.20) (-2.19) (-1.76) (-1.88) (-2.16) (-1.77) (-1.87) 
 
TRSY 8.75% 2017 0.736 0.147 0.598 
 
-1.895 -2.391 -0.332 0.996 8.336 0.932 3.429 2.108 -0.807 -1.825 -7.501 -4.776 -5.599 -5.432 10388.6 
 
(5.91) (4.93) (8.70) 
 
(-0.70) (-2.11) (-0.58) (2.23) (1.29) (1.00) (3.40) (2.44) (-1.86) (-4.42) (-5.58) (-4.02) (-5.20) (-4.99) 
 
TRSY 5% 2018 -0.013 0.010 0.985 
 
-2.961 -2.314 -1.092 0.769 4.717 0.988 0.183 -0.030 -0.126 -0.093 0.296 0.810 -1.383 1.839 6439.2 
 
(-0.22) (1.93) (165.1) 
 
(-2.31) (-3.09) (-5.11) (3.14) (3.02) (1.45) (2.77) (-0.56) (-3.17) (-2.86) (0.33) (1.05) (-1.90) (1.79) 
 
TRSY4.5% 2019 1.285 0.147 0.597 
 
1.209 -5.387 -1.928 2.393 18.243 0.832 8.077 2.990 -0.754 -2.735 -14.036 -6.835 -10.620 -10.109 4825.3 
 
(5.52) (4.09) (7.45) 
 
(0.28) (-2.86) (-2.67) (2.82) (1.46) (0.47) (2.58) (2.39) (-1.05) (-3.99) (-5.06) (-3.05) (-5.36) (-5.07) 
 
TRSY 4.75% 2020 -0.030 0.083 0.642 
 
-2.029 6.048 -2.652 -0.888 21.417 3.166 5.027 3.297 -0.125 -1.640 5.773 6.467 3.333 4.054 8468.7 
 
(-0.26) (4.34) (9.04) 
 
(-1.17) (1.88) (-2.96) (-1.02) (1.68) (1.45) (3.60) (2.89) (-0.17) (-3.22) (4.92) (5.39) (2.93) (2.25) 
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Table 6 cont.: Estimated parameters for a model of conditional volatility with QE and bond market event indicators 
This table contains maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters, 	,  ,   , λ and # , i=1,2,…,14, from the conditional volatility equation of the following model applied to the daily returns of gilts,  , using the 
samples indicated in Table 2. 
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The set of dummy variables, ,, entering both the conditional mean and conditional variance specifications, are indicators of the effects of the three separate phases of QE (QE1, QE2, QE3), the period of time 
between the run on Northern Rock and the start of QE1 (N-Rock), days of announcements relating specifically to QE (QE Ann), days of announcements of the decision of MPC meetings, days on which the bond was 
issued (Own Issue) or purchased by the Bank of England through the QE Asset Purchase Facility (Own Purchase), days that any bond was issued (Issue) and days that any bond was purchased by the Bank of England 
through the QE Asset Purchase Facility (APF), or of other differences related to days of the week (Tues, Wed, Thur, Fri). The indicator variable " takes the value one when 
 $ 0 and is zero otherwise. If λ is not 
significant the model is re-estimated excluding the variable "
 . LogL is the maximized value of the log-likelihood function of the model above. The reported estimates of the parameters  have been multiplied by 
105 and # , i=1,2,…,14, have all been multiplied by 106. Below the parameter estimates are robust t-statistics in parentheses. The table is divided into the official maturity classifications at the end of the sample. 
Gilt Const. 
  
 "
  Own Issue Own Purchase Issue APF QE Ann MPC N-Rock QE1 QE2 QE3 Tues Wed Thur Fri LogL 
Medium-term Gilts 
TRSY 8% 2021 -0.091 0.061 0.702 
 
-8.090 12.840 -0.991 0.176 20.937 2.585 4.018 1.926 1.068 -0.524 4.927 6.753 2.186 4.913 9769.9 
 
(-0.78) (4.08) (9.68) 
 
(-2.31) (1.18) (-0.90) (0.21) (1.80) (1.40) (3.15) (2.07) (1.40) (-1.38) (3.61) (5.38) (1.59) (2.69) 
 
TRSY 4% 2022 1.077 0.115 0.592 
 
-4.767 5.987 -2.502 -1.151 -4.918 1.699 36.352 3.780 1.086 -3.016 -6.225 1.221 -5.839 -6.998 4198.9 
 
(2.70) (2.91) (4.31) 
 
(-0.84) (1.03) (-1.04) (-0.55) (-0.36) (0.37) (1.39) (1.71) (0.75) (-2.34) (-1.29) (0.29) (-1.43) (-1.70) 
 
TRSY 5% 2025 -1.540 0.009 0.996 -0.020 1.921 -8.124 0.604 2.534 5.980 6.245 0.271 -0.211 -0.225 0.048 2.292 3.435 -0.890 1.383 9243.8 
 
(-1.44) (2.31) (256.1) (-3.38) (1.47) (-2.34) (1.93) (2.04) (2.17) (2.98) (4.45) (-1.86) (-1.34) (0.64) (1.19) (1.82) (-0.51) (0.68) 
 
TRSY 4.25% 2027 -0.498 0.076 0.870 
 
-10.847 1.436 1.261 -0.944 21.470 5.653 1.498 0.383 0.704 0.476 8.856 9.207 3.820 8.285 6293.7 
 
(-2.14) (6.13) (42.98) 
 
(-2.37) (0.17) (0.60) (-0.30) (1.71) (1.58) (2.61) (0.49) (0.77) (1.30) (2.44) (2.82) (1.10) (1.81) 
 
Long-term Gilts 
TRSY 6% 2028 -3.340 0.055 0.919 -0.031 -3.050 2.400 1.770 -1.000 25.700 4.920 1.030 0.231 0.375 0.389 4.460 7.320 -0.036 7.090 9050.3 
 
(-2.14) (5.68) (59.10) (-2.36) (-0.53) (0.39) (1.31) (-0.48) (2.97) (2.03) (2.71) (0.49) (0.63) (1.70) (1.70) (3.39) (-0.01) (2.36) 
 
TRSY 4.75% 2030 -0.852 0.110 0.811 
 
-5.855 1.308 0.397 -0.908 29.144 6.260 1.810 0.652 0.594 0.369 14.375 19.468 9.477 11.931 5107.8 
 
(-2.46) (6.03) (31.92) 
 
(-0.64) (0.15) (0.13) (-0.25) (1.56) (1.07) (1.99) (0.49) (0.39) (0.51) (2.86) (4.09) (1.89) (1.78) 
 
TRSY 4.25% 2032 -4.920 0.064 0.917 -0.036 -1.020 -1.000 2.150 -0.025 29.600 7.560 1.140 0.254 0.554 0.585 6.910 8.230 1.550 10.200 8719.1 
 
(-2.41) (6.06) (61.49) (-2.56) (-0.17) (-0.11) (1.18) (-0.01) (2.56) (2.32) (2.40) (0.39) (0.70) (1.87) (1.97) (3.00) (0.49) (2.56) 
 
TRSY 4.25% 2036 -5.000 0.049 0.948 -0.035 -1.890 1.870 2.030 -1.050 19.500 9.050 0.789 0.020 0.244 0.446 6.580 7.960 0.558 9.840 8561.6 
 
(-2.32) (5.30) (78.98) (-2.91) (-0.32) (0.34) (1.19) (-0.48) (1.82) (2.46) (2.18) (0.03) (0.37) (1.57) (1.70) (2.60) (0.16) (2.32) 
 
TRSY 4.75% 2038 -9.680 0.096 0.873 -0.049 -17.600 -3.000 1.820 0.803 35.200 9.310 1.900 0.787 1.560 1.240 15.400 14.900 5.080 19.600 8259.1 
 
(-4.27) (6.13) (45.49) (-2.63) (-4.60) (-0.29) (0.75) (0.19) (1.92) (2.28) (2.62) (0.61) (1.02) (2.26) (4.16) (4.91) (1.38) (4.45) 
 
TRSY 4.25% 2039 -0.233 0.121 0.677 
 
-32.810 21.067 -5.128 -7.485 -0.342 15.620 -41.924 4.780 5.127 -0.471 11.452 32.324 10.728 11.933 3666.7 
 
(-0.37) (3.57) (8.04) 
 
(-1.59) (1.44) (-0.92) (-1.20) (-0.01) (1.28) (-0.16) (1.41) (1.23) (-0.25) (1.41) (4.18) (1.26) (1.15) 
 
TRSY 4.5% 2042 -1.599 0.083 0.882 
 
8.354 -0.859 4.473 -2.934 14.562 12.889 0.300 1.016 2.031 1.967 23.459 26.465 8.083 25.527 5112.2 
 
(-3.14) (5.19) (37.39) 
 
(0.69) (-0.10) (1.07) (-0.77) (0.76) (1.71) (0.43) (0.75) (1.14) (2.33) (2.96) (3.55) (1.14) (2.62) 
 
TRSY 4.25% 2046 -0.872 0.077 0.890 
 
-7.666 1.870 4.096 -2.047 13.936 9.824 0.891 0.668 1.722 1.528 12.844 11.741 9.137 13.670 6021.6 
 
(-2.04) (5.57) (44.96) 
 
(-0.70) (0.16) (1.11) (-0.41) (0.70) (1.51) (1.24) (0.44) (0.93) (2.00) (1.78) (1.77) (1.39) (1.66) 
 
TRSY 4.25% 2049 -0.812 0.116 0.748 
 
23.824 23.645 -16.903 -7.966 21.853 19.793 24.218 3.769 3.392 -0.112 16.048 41.628 12.701 26.516 3861.3 
 
(-1.07) (4.12) (13.34) 
 
(0.52) (1.16) (-2.64) (-0.86) (0.66) (1.33) (2.53) (1.02) (0.79) (-0.06) (1.52) (4.05) (1.14) (1.86) 
 
TRSY 4.25% 2055 -8.160 0.076 0.928 -0.047 -0.856 3.910 3.840 -2.500 22.000 18.200 0.838 0.402 1.080 1.340 12.900 9.940 5.300 12.100 6721.2 
 
(-1.87) (5.84) (68.16) (-2.88) (-0.07) (0.38) (1.12) (-0.59) (1.04) (2.57) (1.39) (0.32) (0.67) (1.79) (1.67) (1.42) (0.76) (1.46) 
 
Gilt Index 0.343 0.069 0.932 -0.064 
  
3.250 0.801 27.300 -2.970 1.110 -0.394 0.252 0.094 -6.490 5.540 1.850 1.420 8621.5 
 
(0.19) (6.60) (78.91) (-4.95) 
  
(1.83) (0.73) (2.35) (-1.14) (2.68) (-0.69) (0.30) (0.26) (-2.27) (2.01) (0.60) (0.41) 
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Table 7: Event study type test of pre-QE volatility reductions 
 
This table contains the cumulative average percentage change in volatility in the days prior to: (QE0) the announcement that the Bank of 
England will establish an asset purchase facility, 19/01/09; (QE1) the announcement of the start of QE1, 5/3/09; (QE2) the announcement of the 
start of QE2, 6/10/11; (QE3) the announcement of the start of QE3, 5/7/12. Volatility is measured as the squared daily return on the gilt. Three 
different event windows are examined, starting 10, 20 and 40 days prior to these announcements. In parentheses below the percentage changes 
are robust t-statistics. Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is indicated with ***,**,* respectively. 
Event Window QE0 QE1 QE2 QE3 
%  10, %  9,… . , %  1 -125.7% -38.6% -76.7% 551.1%*** 
 (-1.17) (-0.34) (-1.02) (8.39) 
%  20, %  19,… . , %  1 -344.0%*** -11.0% 380.4% 216.2%** 
 (-3.39) (-0.12) (5.76)*** (2.51) 
%  40, %  39,… . , %  1 -171.4% 197.7%** 69.7% 204.6%** 
 (-1.61) (2.28) (0.98) (2.66) 
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Table 8: Cross section determinants of bond volatility sensitivities 
This table reports the results of cross section regressions (24 observations) to explain the sensitivities of bond volatility to the indicator variables in Table 6 above. 
For each bond, its estimated coefficient (standardized by its standard error) for a given factor is regressed against its coupon, time to maturity, and other 
characteristics, such as the amount of APF activity it experienced (Purchases), the average Excess Supply at each of its own Purchase auctions (Excess Supply), the 
size of the issue (Size) and the change in the size of the issue through the sample (Issuance). A positive estimated coefficient in these regressions means that this 
characteristic of the bond makes it more likely that its volatility will increase when experiencing the particular event or QE period. Heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust t-statistics are reported below each coefficient. P-Val(Wald) is the p-value of a robust F-statistic for the overall significance of the regression. 
Panel A: Phases of QE and Purchase Activity  
 
Const. Coupon Maturity Purchases Excess Supply +, P-Val (Wald) 
QE1 -3.694 0.480 <0.001 2.581 -0.453 0.277 <0.001 
(-8.19) (5.43) (4.56) (4.41) (-3.26) 
QE2 -2.398 -0.045 <0.001 2.450 0.505 0.592 <0.001 
 
(-2.31) (-0.23) (2.87) (5.78) (3.28) 
  QE3 1.524 -0.462 <0.001 -1.442 0.854 0.688 <0.001 
 
(1.14) (-3.06) (1.59) (-1.43) (3.93) 
  Northern Rock 0.434 0.353 <0.001 
  
0.147 0.020 
 
(0.46) (2.69) (-0.33) 
    Own Purchases -1.209 0.130 <0.001 0.872 0.691 0.158 0.002 
 
(-1.15) (0.92) (-0.09) (1.32) (2.07) 
  APF Days -5.463 0.513 <0.001 3.132 -0.641 0.208 <0.001 
 
(-4.42) (5.68) (2.55) (2.39) (-1.81) 
  Panel B: Announcements relating to QE 
 
Const. Coupon Maturity Purchases Issuance +, P-Val (Wald) 
MPC -1.527 0.085 <0.001 3.756 -2.068 0.529 0.004 
 
(-0.55) (0.33) (4.29) (2.19) (-1.49) 
  QEANN 3.211 -0.176 <0.001 0.162 -1.566 <0.001 0.697 
 
(1.85) (-1.07) (0.32) (0.12) (-1.29) 
  Panel C: Issuance Activity 
C Coupon Maturity Issuance Size +, P-Val (Wald) 
Own Issue 6.465 -0.561 <0.001 -5.144 |<|-0.001 <0.001 <0.023 
(1.63) (-1.69) (0.34) (-2.27) (-1.29) 
Issue 4.499 -0.895 <0.001 -5.083 |<|-0.001 0.366 <0.001 
 
(1.19) (-2.11) (3.22) (-1.68) (-0.31) 
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Table 9: Granger-causality tests between gilt volatility and the money supply 
This table contains the Wald test p-values for bivariate Granger causality tests between the monthly volatility of the named gilt and the 
monthly money supply (UK M0). The testing procedure follows Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and ensures that the Wald test statistics are 
asymptotically distributed chi-squared. Gilt volatility is the standard deviation of the daily returns from the day after the prior month 
money supply data release until the day of the current month money supply release. Money supply data were obtained from the Bank 
of England’s data service. 
Bond Name Money Supply → Gilt Volatility Gilt Volatility → Money Supply 
TRSY 4.5% 2013 0.873 0.134 
TRSY 8% 2013 0.665 0.090 
TRSY 5% 2014 0.866 0.423 
TRSY 4.75% 2015 0.203 0.333 
TRSY 8% 2015 0.183 0.302 
TRSY 4% 2016 0.046 0.108 
TRSY 8.75% 2017 0.018 0.233 
TRSY 5% 2018 0.023 0.101 
TRSY4.5% 2019 0.107 0.211 
TRSY 4.75% 2020 0.006 0.218 
TRSY 8% 2021 0.006 0.371 
TRSY 4% 2022 0.244 0.900 
TRSY 5% 2025 0.007 0.426 
TRSY 4.25% 2027 0.055 0.198 
TRSY 6% 2028 0.009 0.259 
TRSY 4.75% 2030 0.061 0.165 
TRSY 4.25% 2032 0.031 0.149 
TRSY 4.25% 2036 0.031 0.105 
TRSY 4.75% 2038 0.035 0.100 
TRSY 4.25% 2039 0.093 0.095 
TRSY 4.25% 2042 0.105 0.094 
TRSY 4.25% 2046 0.050 0.051 
TRSY 4.25% 2049 0.134 0.321 
TRSY 4.25% 2055 0.051 0.081 
Gilt Index 0.015 0.088 
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Figure 1: Gilt gross and net issuance 
This figure shows the annual total gilt gross and net issuance from 1990/91 to 2013/14. (Source: UK 
DMO) 
 
Figure 2: Gilt issuance and Purchase Auctions 
This figure shows the monthly total gilt issuance and total purchase auction payments for the gilt market 
through the sample period. (Source: Bank of England and UK DMO). 
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Figure 3: Gilt Issuance by day of the week 
This figure shows the distribution of gilt issuance across the days of the week for each of the sub-samples. 
The bars are ratio of the number of times that weekday was used for issuance to the total number of that 
weekday in the sub-sample. For example, over 45 percent of all Wednesdays during the QE1 phase 
experienced gilt issuance. (Source: UK DMO) 
 
 
Figure 4: Gilt Purchase Auctions by day of the week 
This figure shows the distribution of gilt purchase auctions across the days of the week for each of the 
sub-samples. The bars are ratio of the number of times that weekday was used for purchase auctions to 
the total number of that weekday in the sub-sample. For example, almost 80 percent of all Wednesdays 
during the QE1 phase experienced gilt purchase auctions. (Source: Bank of England). 
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Figure 5: Estimated Conditional Volatility for Gilt Returns 
This figure contains examples, for each maturity range (Ultra-short, Short, Medium and Long), of the time series of conditional volatility for gilt 
returns over the sample period. 
Treasury 8% 2015 
 
 
Treasury 4.75% 2020 
 
 
Treasury 5% 2025 
 
Treasury 4.25% 2032 
 
 
.002
.004
.006
.008
.010
.012
04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Conditional standard deviation
Northern
Rock
QE1 QE2 QE3
.000
.004
.008
.012
.016
.020
.024
04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Conditional standard deviation
Northern
Rock
QE1 QE2 QE3
